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INTRODUCTION

When Jane Come and Geneva DeVane filed a complaint in the mid-1970s
against their employer, Bausch and Lomb, they alleged what they deemed a
form of discrimination.' The two women worked as clerical staff and were
supervised by a man named Leon Price, who, they alleged, subjected them to
repeated verbal and physical sexual advances at work, which escalated to a
point that both women were forced to resign. 2 The complaint alleged that this
behavior violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 enacted more than
a decade earlier, because the imposition of unwanted sexual advances by a
supervisor or the granting of rewards for sexual submission were forms of
4
illegal sex discrimination.
The district judge was openly incredulous about their claim.5 All previous
cases of sex discrimination "arose out of company policies" and involved
"apparently some advantage to, or gain by, the employer from such
discriminatory practices. '6 But here, "Mr. Price's conduct appears to be
nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism.... [He]
was satisfying a personal urge."'7 And if that was the case, how could "it be
Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University.
I Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975).
2 Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. (2012).
4 Come, 390 F. Supp. at 162-63.
5Id.
6 Id. at 163.

7Id.
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construed that the conduct complained of was company-directed policy which
deprived women of employment opportunities"? 8 Indeed, the court continued,
a "reasonably intelligent reading of the statute" shows that it cannot be read to
cover actions, even by a supervisor, which "had no relationship to the nature of
the employment." 9 It would be "ludicrous" to find this conduct actionable
simply because it was directed at females alone (lots of them, according to the
complaint), and recognition of this cause of action would mean "a potential
federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented
advances toward another."' 0 Employers would be forced to "have employees
who were asexual" since that would be the "only sure way ...[to] avoid such
charges."' I (And one could imagine the court's wondering whether there were
enough asexual adults in the workforce to make millions and millions of
contact lenses.) The court thus concluded that the women had failed to state a
2
claim under Title VII and dismissed the complaint.'
The ruling in Come, like a similar ruling the following year in which a
federal district court dismissed a discrimination complaint alleging sexual
assault on the theory that Title VII was "not intended to provide a federal tort
remedy for what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the
part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather
than a back alley,"' 13 is a touchstone in the development of sexual harassment
law. It signaled the emerging awareness of "sexual harassment," a newfound
label for conduct that had long been experienced by (mostly) women in the
workplace, but seldom discussed and never challenged. But the ruling also
marked the beginning of sexual harassment law by raising questions that courts
and commentators would spend decades trying to answer: What is sexual
harassment? What does it have to do with equal employment opportunity? And
who can be held liable for it?
The history of sexual harassment law-which I have occasion to consider as
part of this symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII-can be divided,
if not neatly, into three eras. The 1970s was home to the emergence of
consciousness about the frequency and harm of sexually harassing behaviors in
the workplace-and a name to describe them. The 1980s and 1990s saw the
development and embrace of a theoretical understanding of sexual harassment
as a form of discrimination, outlined in Catharine MacKinnon's path-breaking
1979 book, The Sexual Harassmentof Working Women, 14 and the development

8

1d.

9 Id.
10

Id.

1'Id.at 163-64.
12Id.at 165.
13 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976).
14 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE

OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). The foremother of harassment law has written her own

reflection on the law's development. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of
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of a comprehensive set of substantive principles about what constitutes
actionable harassment and who can be held liable for it. Finally, the last decade
and a half has seen critique on both ends-from some scholars who claim
sexual harassment law has gone too far (or in the wrong direction) and from
others who claim it has failed to transmit cultural understandings necessary for
equality and stalled with a type of complacency about a system that has largely
failed to eradicate the harassing behaviors that continue to impede women's
equal opportunity in the workplace.
In a landmark article, political scientists Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat examined
the complex social process that connects injury to a remedy.' 5 They set forth
three stages in the emergence of disputes: naming ("saying to oneself that a
particular experience has been injurious"); blaming (occurring "when a person
attributes an injury to the fault of another individual or social entity"); and
claiming (occurring "when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or
entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy"). 16 All three
transformations must occur in order for an aggrieved individual to gain access
to justice. 17 At a broader level, though, these same processes must occur for a
particular type of conduct-in this case, sexual harassment-to be addressed.
We must collectively identify a behavior and deem it wrongful, decide who
can be blamed (or at least held accountable), and then provide the legal and
extralegal mechanisms through which the blameworthy can be forced to
remedy the harm to the victims. In this Essay, I will trace the key
Experience: Reflections on the Development of Sexual HarassmentLaw, 90 GEO. L.J. 813

(2002).
15 William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.

15 LAW & Soc'v REv. 631

(1980-81).
16Id. at 635. On this social process, see also Austin Sarat, Exploring the Hidden
Domains of Civil Justice: "Naming, Blaming, and Claiming" in Popular Culture, 50
DEPAuL L. REv. 425 (2000) (discussing The Sweet Hereafter, a film that "tells a story in
words and pictures of the seldom seen processes of naming, blaming, and claiming," and
thereby "provides a vehicle for understanding the manner in which civil justice is
mythologized"); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 525 (1980-81) (exploring "the
origins of disputes in grievances and claims," and finding that while claims are often made
in a vast majority of problem types, such as real property and debt, "[t]he one exception to
this pattern is found among discrimination grievants, of whom only 29.4 percent made a
claim"); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31

UCLA L. REv. 4, 11-26 (1983) ("[Elven where injuries are perceived, a common response is
resignation" and how this may be explained by those who "decide that the gain is too low,
or the cost is too high, including the psychic costs of pursuing the claim.").
17See Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in

the Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1151, 1155 (2000) ("[A] victim must
identify the behavior as harassment, recognize the availability of a legal remedy, and report
her victimization to some forum insome manner.").
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developments in sexual harassment law and theory over the last forty years, as
we move from naming to blaming to claiming-and perhaps to questioning.
I.

THE EARLY YEARS: PUTTING A NAME TO A BEHAVIOR

Sexual harassment preceded sexual harassment law. We can point to the
sexual abuse and harassment of female slaves by their masters,18 the sexual
hostility and attacks of early twentieth century female industrial workers in the
factories where they worked, 19 or the generations of secretaries groped by their
bosses in the office (depicted masterfully on the big screen by Dabney
Coleman and Dolly Parton in Nine to Five).20 And if we look only in the
modem era but across different contexts, we find it not only in the workplace,
but also in schools, prisons, housing authorities, on the street, and in virtually
every type of institution. But it is naming the behavior rather than its mere
existence that leads to the establishment of a legal structure to control it. For
sexual harassment, this happened in the late 1970s as a number of forces
coalesced. A popular women's magazine, Redbook, published results of a
survey titled What Men Do to Women on the Job,2 1 which found unwelcome
sexual comments and advances to be pervasive in the workplace. In 1981, the
federal government published a groundbreaking study reporting that four in ten
female employees had experienced harassing behaviors in the prior two
years. 22 Other studies and surveys joined a growing chorus that led to the
collective labeling of certain behaviors as "sexual harassment" and the
eventual melding of outrage with the protections of Title VII, a statute that had
been on the books for more than a decade already. 23 In the background was the
18 See KERRY SEGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600

TO 1993, at 16-17 (1994); see also LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 40-44 (1978).
19See SEGRAVE, supra note 18, at 61-80 ("Sexual harassment continued unabated in
factory work well into the 20th century.").
20 See id. at 103-22; see also Jill Laurie Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some
Observations on the Distance Traveled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 445
(1981); NINE TO FIvE (IPC Films 1980).
21 Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 217.
22 See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL

WORKPLACE: ISITA PROBLEM? 20 (1981).
23 See, e.g., CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER 27-28 (1976); FARLEY,
supra note 18, at 18-21 (discussing studies and surveys finding widespread sexual
harassment); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE

FEDERAL WORKPLACE: AN UPDATE (1988); Douglas D. Baker et al., The Influence of
Individual Characteristics and Severity of Harassing Behavior on Reactions to Sexual

Harassment, 22 SEX ROLES 305, 305-06 (1990) ("Research findings over the past fifteen
years indicate that sexual harassment is both a pervasive and serious problem."); Susan R.
Meredith, UsingFact Finders to Probe Workplace Claims of Sexual Harassment,47 ARB. J.
61, 61 (1992) (citing studies that estimate that fifty to eighty percent of female workers have
been sexually harassed); Beth E. Schneider, Consciousness About Sexual Harassment
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women's rights movement, and in the foreground was Catharine MacKinnon's
theory of why harassment should be deemed an actionable wrong. 24 Sexual
harassment was, in Martha Chamallas's words, the "quintessential feminist
harm .... The term was invented by feminist activists, given content by
feminist litigators and scholars, and sustained by a wide-ranging body of
scholarship generated largely by feminist academics. '25 And with its roots
firmly established, sexual harassment was thrust on a very public stage when
Anita Hill accused Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas of sexually
harassing her while he was chairing the federal agency in charge of
implementing the nation's anti-discrimination laws.26 He was confirmed to the
Supreme Court despite her allegations, but her airing of the issue catalyzed
public awareness, litigation, and judicial awareness of sexual harassment. The
rest, as they say, is history.
II. THE ADOLESCENT YEARS:
THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND How OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
After a few false starts in the mid-1970s, courts slowly began to recognize
that sexual harassment in the workplace could violate Title VII. Barnes v.
Costle,27 a 1977 case in the D.C. Circuit, is credited with being the first
appellate decision to recognize quid pro quo harassment as actionable under
Title VII. There, the court concluded that if a woman proved she was fired
because she refused to have a sexual relationship with her supervisor, she had
established actionable discrimination. 28 "It is much too late in the day," the
Among Heterosexual and Lesbian Women Workers, 38 J. Soc. IssuEs 75, 83-85 (1982)
(discussing a study showing that "significant proportions of each sexual identity group
experienced [sexual harassment] incidents in the year prior to the study"). For narrative
descriptions of this history, see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107
YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) (discussing the current sexual desire-dominance paradigm); Vicki
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2074-82 (2003) (discussing the
American women's movement)..
24 See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 66
(2006) (explaining MacKinnon's influence and that the "law of sexual harassment
represents one of the most direct translations of legal theory into legal doctrine").
25 MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 237 (2d ed. 2003).
26 See Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1445 (1992) (discussing her reaction to the response from her Senate Judiciary Committee
Testimony); see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 25, at 246 (stating that the "confirmation
hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas marked the most intense moment of public awareness
and public debate about sexual harassment").
27 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Other cases in the first batch include Vinson v. Taylor,
753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
28 Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989 n.49 ("The vitiating sex factor thus stemmed not from the fact
that what appellant's superior demanded was sexual activity ... but from the fact that he
imposed upon her tenure in her then position a condition which ostensibly he would not

1034

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1029

court wrote, "to contend that Title VII does not outlaw terms of employment
for women which differ appreciably from those set for men, and which are not
genuinely and reasonably related to performance on the job. '29 And "but for
her womanhood... her participation in sexual activity would never have been
solicited.... [She] was asked to bow to his demands as the price for holding
her job."' 30 And the federal agency for which the plaintiff worked was in no
position, factually speaking, to exonerate itself under a theory that the
supervisor's actions contravened company policy and were redressed as soon
31
as discovered.
Two years later, MacKinnon's game-changing book was published, in
which she gave a cogent explanation for why sexual harassment should be
treated as intentional discrimination and distinguished between two types of
harassment-quid pro quo and hostile environment. 32 Literally "this for that,"
quid pro quo harassment involved threats of adverse action to coerce sexual
submission. 33 Hostile environment harassment came to be understood as
unwelcome sexual conduct that is severe or pervasive and which creates a
subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive working environment. 34 Her
framework was adopted virtually wholesale by the EEOC, which published its
first guidelines on sexual harassment 1980.35 The guidelines defined actionable
harassment as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature... when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
have fastened upon a male employee.").
29 Id at 989-90.
30 Id.at 990.
31Id.at 993. Often lost in the conventional telling of sexual harassment history is that
Barnes, like many of the women plaintiffs in the early cases, was African-American. See
MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 826 (suggesting that women's race combined with the fact
that "most of the men judges ... had confronted their own group-based inequalities" may
explain the earliest cases that recognized harassment as a civil rights issue). That sexual
harassment is often racialized is important, but seldom discussed. See generally Sumi K.
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority
Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177 (1997); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three
Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
817(1993).
32 MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 32. MacKinnon distinguished between harassment "in
which sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment
opportunity," and harassment that is a "persistent condition of work." Id.
33 Id.
34Id.
3'EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677
(Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1980)). This section of the Guidelines
was rescinded in 1999 and replaced with new guidelines reflecting new Supreme Court
opinions on employer liability, discussed infra.
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individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 36
The guidelines also proposed standards for employer liability, providing that
vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors would turn on "the particular
37
employment relationship and the job functions performed by the individual.
The EEOC guidelines were a kind of Kool-Aid. The default had now flippedfrom the incredulous reaction by courts to the very idea that harassment could
be actionable under Title VII to a virtual consensus that harassment was not
only actionable, but also struck at the very heart of women's inequality in the
workplace. But right from the start there was disagreement, or at least
confusion, about whether employers ought to be held responsible for
harassment by employees, even those with supervisory authority, when the
harassment itself was so clearly outside the scope of employment in most
cases. George MacKinnon, a D.C. Circuit judge and also Catharine
MacKinnon's father, raised this question in a concurrence in Barnes v. Costle,
querying whether an employer could be deemed at fault for conduct it did not
38
order or condone.
The Supreme Court, in its first foray into sexual harassment law, in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 39 affirmed the consensus that quid pro quo and hostile
environment harassment are actionable forms of discrimination. And while it
agreed that harassment must be "unwelcome" in order to be actionable-and,
controversially, that "a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress"
may be relevant and admissible-it held that a complainant's participation in
"sexual episodes" may be voluntary, but nonetheless "unwelcome." 40 The
Meritor Court, however, cemented confusion over the proper standard for
employer liability, eschewing a clear rule in favor of a vague direction to lower
courts to look to "agency principles" in deciding when employers could be
held liable for sexual harassment in the workplace. 4 1 In defining the possible
continuum of employer liability, the Court rejected both a rule of automatic
liability and a rule requiring actual notice. 42 Lower courts then plunged into the
amorphous concept of "agency principles" to determine whether employers
could or should be held liable for sexual harassment under various
36

Id.

37 Id.
38 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring)

(reasoning that the common law imputes no liability on the employer, and that any liability
must come entirely from statute).
" 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
40

Id. at 67.

41 Id. at
42

Id.

72.
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circumstances. 43 They tended to agree that employers were strictly liable when
supervisors carried out quid pro quo threats-the women who didn't sleep with
them despite being threatened were fired-but reached wildly inconsistent
results in other types of cases. 44 There was no consensus to be found in cases
where women submitted to their supervisor's demands, where the supervisor
failed to carry out the threatened action, or where the harassment was the
45
hostile environment variety.

While lower courts volleyed over the employer liability standards, the
Supreme Court decided two more cases on the definition of actionable
harassment. In 1993, in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc.,46 the Court considered
how badly hostile environment harassment must injure its victim before it
becomes actionable (before causing severe psychological injury) and from
whose perspective it should be judged (a reasonable person in the shoes of the
victim). 47 Five years later, it considered whether same-sex harassment could be
actionable given the statute's requirement that unlawful discrimination be
43 The Supreme Court interpreted Title VII, under which the term "employer" is defined
to include "agents," to require this analysis. Meritor,477 U.S. at 72.
4 See, e.g., Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In a
situation of quid pro quo sexual harassment by a supervisor, where the harassment 'results in
a tangible detriment to the subordinate employee, liability is imputed to the employer.");
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Once quid pro quo sexual
harassment has been established, the harasser's employer is, ipso facto, liable."); Bouton v.
BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1994); Kaufmann v. Allied Signal, Inc.,
970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311,
1316 (11th Cir. 1989); Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989)
("Hostile environment and quid pro quo harassment causes of action are not always clearly
distinct and separate."); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988); Bundy
v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The Guidelines go on to reaffirm that an
employer is responsible for discriminatory acts of its agent and supervisory employees with
respect to sexual harassment just as with other forms of discrimination, regardless of
whether the employer authorized or knew or even should have known of the acts ...").
41 Compare Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
the mere threat of adverse action conditioned on sexual submission constitutes a quid pro
quo in violation of Title VII), Nichols, 42 F.3d at 511 (same), and Karibian v. Columbia
Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1994) (same), with Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Ci.
1995) (only threats that are carried out constitute an actionable quid pro quo).
46 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
47 Plaintiff had urged the court to adopt a "reasonable woman" standard for evaluatingwhether an environment was objectively hostile enough to be actionable. This issue had
been ruled on by the Ninth Circuit and fully briefed, but the Supreme Court never
mentioned the issue in its ruling. Instead, it reformulated the test to reflect the perspective of
the "reasonable person in the victim's shoes," presumably making room for factfinders to
account for the influence of the victim's gender on perceptions of the hostile environment.
Id.at 20-21 ("This standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible
psychological injury.").
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"because of sex."' 48 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,49 the Court held
that Title VII does not categorically exclude same-sex harassment (as the lower
court had held), but that an employee pursuing such a theory would have to
specifically prove the conduct occurred because of sex (e.g., the harasser was
motivated by homosexual desire or targeted only people of one sex).50 Nor
does Title VII require that harassment be sexual in nature, as long as it is
because of sex (gender). "[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual
desire," the Court wrote, "to support an inference of discrimination on the
basis of sex." 5'
In its first three sexual harassment cases, the Supreme Court had ruled in
favor of a broad reading of Title VII and robust substantive law against
harassment, but of course it left many substantive issues for the lower courts to
resolve. The Court established early on and without dispute that individuals
could not be held liable for harassment, 52 but neither were their motives
53
relevant to the determination whether a hostile environment had been created.
Nor, in most cases, do restrictions on verbal or visual harassment violate
fundamental principles of free speech. 54 Other cases considered less central,
but still important, questions. Courts have considered, for example, whether
sexual favoritism is actionable under Title VII. Most have concluded that it can
be, in accordance with the EEOC's position on the issue, but only if it is
sufficiently widespread to change the entire tenor of the workplace. 55 Thus, a

48 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2002).

49 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
50 Id. at 80-82. The "because of sex" question can be raised in contexts other than samesex harassment. For example, in Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2014), a
woman complained about, among other things, the fact that co-workers were having sex on
her desk at night when she wasn't there. While the court agreed this conduct was disturbing
and hostile, there was no evidence that the choice of her office was made because of her sex
and therefore was not an actionable form of discrimination. Id. In a related vein, the Second
Circuit affirmed that the actions of an equal opportunity harasser-a fire department chief
grabbed men by their testicles and women by their breasts-did not harass "because of sex."
Carpenter v. City of Torrington, 100 F. App'x 858, 860 (2d Cir. 2004).
"' Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; see also Harris,510 U.S. at 19 (treating comments like "[w]e
need a man as the rental manager," and references to the complainant as a "dumb ass
woman" as part of an actionable hostile environment).
52

See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on

other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Williams v.
Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, a high-ranking officer's behavior
can be imputed to the employer under an alter ego theory of liability. See, e.g., Torres v.
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634-35 & n. 11 (2d Cir. 1997).
11 MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 826 (discussing the irrelevance of motive).
54 See generally J.M. Balkin, FreeSpeech andHostile Environments, 99 COLuM. L. REv.
2295 (1999).

11 See, e.g., Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005) (interpreting
California's anti-discrimination law to ban sexual favoritism in the same circumstances as
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prison warden who played his three paramours off one another in a quest for
his approval and promotions, turning the prison into a highly sexualized
environment, ran afoul of this standard. 56 Courts have also considered the
standard for evaluating sexual harassment of adolescents, concluding in one
case, for example, that sexual advances towards individuals below the age of
sexual consent are unwelcome as a matter of law. 57 Many courts have
considered whether context is relevant to the creation of a hostile environment.
For example, is graphic sex talk in a comedy writers' room less likely to
constitute harassment than in a law office? The California Supreme Court,
interpreting a state discrimination law with similar protections, said yescontext matters, and mere talk, if not directed at anyone in particular and not
58
reflecting hostility to women as a group, was not actionable.
In a separate, but extremely important set of cases, the court developed the
retaliation doctrine-protection for employees who complained of harassment
or cooperated with investigations of complaints by others. As with the core
sexual harassment doctrine, the Supreme Court handed down a series of
rulings that, at least on their face, purported to sweep broadly in favor of
victims of harassment. With some statutes, such as Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, the Supreme Court had to first decide whether
retaliation against discrimination complainants was actionable at all because
Congress made no mention of such protection in the text. But the Court had no
trouble deciding in the Title IX context that protection against retaliation is an
integral part of protection against discrimination in the first instance. Thus, it
ruled in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education59 that protection against
retaliation is an essential and therefore inherent component of an
antidiscrimination law.60 The alternative would be to create a cruel Catch-22
Title VII does).
56 Id;
see also

EEOC Guidance No. 915.048, EEOC (Jan. 12, 1990),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html,
archived at http://perna.cc/334G7MMK; Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 858 (1988) (arguing that little sexual liberty is lost when an employer
prohibits "amorous relationships in which one party has direct authority to affect the
working... status of the other").
7 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2008).
58 Lyle v. Warner Bros., 132 P.3d 211, 228, 231 (Cal. 2006). Compare Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (rejecting claim by a woman in
a blue collar job because "Title VII was not meant" to change an environment in which
"sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound"), and Gross v.
Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim by a female
truck driver because in "the real world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not
perceived as hostile or abusive. Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or endured as
normal human behavior."), with Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Gross "illogical").
" 544 U.S. 167, 184 (2005).
60 Id. at 174; see also Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding implied
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for victims-either say nothing and have no legal recourse against the
harassment, or speak up and risk retaliation with no legal recourse to challenge
it.61

The Court could skip this preliminary question in Title VII because the
statute expressly, if inartfully, prohibits retaliation against those who oppose
unlawful discrimination or participate in complaint proceedings. 62 The
questions, then, focused on what types of actions qualified as retaliatory and
what types of opposition or participation triggered protection against them. In
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White,63 the Court ruled
broadly in favor of the plaintiff, Sheila White, a female track laborer who was
removed from a more desirable position after she complained about her
supervisor's anti-woman comments and who was written up for a false
infraction after complaining a second time. 64 In response to the two questions it
was asked, the Court ruled first that retaliatory action could be unlawful even if
not work-related (e.g., a threat of bodily harm) and second that retaliation is
actionable if it is materially adverse, meaning "it well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. '65 In
White's case, a month-long suspension without pay and reassignment to a less
66
desirable position were certainly sufficient to meet this standard.
But what the Court gave with one hand-meaningful protection against
retaliation in Burlington Northern-it took away with the other. In a quiet, per
curiam decision, Clark County School District v. Breeden,67 the Court
dismissed a retaliation claim because "[n]o reasonable person could have
believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's
standard. '68 The "single incident" was a conversation and a chuckle between
two men about a job applicant, who had allegedly once told a co-worker "I
hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon."69 Vicki
Breeden, also in the meeting to screen applicants, complained about the

right against retaliation in Title VI).
61 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-8 1.
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) (prohibiting "discrimination for making charges,

testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings"). The protection against
retaliation is divided into two clauses: the opposition clause and the participation clause.
The former protects those who complain formally or informally of discrimination or who
cooperate with investigations into the complaints of others (see discussion of Crawford,
infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text), while the latter protects only those who
participate in the investigation of formal EEOC charges.
63 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
64Id. at 57-59.
65 Id. at 67-68.
66 Id. at 70.
67 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
68 Id.
69 Id.

at 269.
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discussion. 70 And while a single comment of this nature, even directed at the
employee, would not be severe or pervasive enough to trigger liability under
Title VII, the Court's sweeping and casual pronouncement that only
objectively reasonable complaints of discrimination trigger retaliation
protection would unleash a torrent of bad case law, discussed below.
The ruling in Breeden would undercut the benefits of a later retaliation case,
Crawfordv. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,7 1 in
which the Court ostensibly handed down another victory for victims of
retaliation. It reversed a federal appellate ruling that had denied protection
from retaliation to employees who participate as witnesses in an employee's
72
internal investigation into harassment charges brought by other employees.
When Vicky Crawford was interviewed in connection with a harassment
charge brought by a co-worker, she told the investigator of many instances in
which the accused harasser had behaved in a sexually inappropriate way in the
workplace. 73 The "opposition clause" was broad enough to encompass the
provision of information relevant to an investigation or charge, regardless of
whether the employee actively "opposed" discrimination by coming forward
independently, or passively "opposed" by merely cooperating. 74 Employers
could not turn internal investigations into charades by punishing those who
provided relevant information, even if they did not insist on being heard. 75 The
Sixth Circuit had ruled that Crawford was not protected by the "participation"
clause because the investigation with which she cooperated was internal rather
than part of the formal enforcement mechanisms for Title VII, an EEOC
charge. 76 The Supreme Court did not need to consider that ruling since it held
that Crawford was protected under the opposition clause, even as it held that
protection under the participation clause is significantly broader. 77 Per
Breeden, an employee who "opposes" conduct she perceives as discriminatory
is only protected against retaliation if the court agrees that her belief that
discrimination occurred was objectively reasonable, a hurdle discussed more in
78
the next section.
In 1998, the Court returned to the issue of employer liability for harassment,
taking up the most common points of contention in lower courts-how much
weight to give an employer's harassment policy in determining liability and
Id.
555 U.S. 271, 280 (2009).
72 Id.
71 Crawford was herself a Victim of harassment by the same man, Gene Hughes, but had
not complained because Hughes was the person responsible for receiving harassment
complaints. Id. at 274.
70

71

74

Id. at 277.

71 Id. at 273.
76 Id. at 275.
77

Id. at 280.

78

See Clark Cnty. Sch, Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
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whether to penalize plaintiffs who failed to make use of available grievance
procedures. 79 In Faragher and Ellerth, the Court jointly held that for
supervisory harassment culminating in a tangible employment action (new
lingo to describe an unsuccessful quid pro quo), employers are automatically
liable.80 While supervisors are seldom acting within the scope of employment
when they harass-indeed, the Court noted in Ellerth, they often act "for
personal motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of
the employer"8 '-they are typically aided by the existence of the agency
relation, an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. But for
supervisory harassment without such a consequence, employers may assert a
two-prong affirmative defense, which operates as a bar to liability or
damages 82:
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to
83
avoid harm otherwise.
The Court in these cases also approved the lower court consensus that
claims involving co-worker rather than supervisory harassment should be
governed by a negligence standard, holding employers liable only when they
knew or should have known of the harassment, but failed to take prompt and

79 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
80 Faragher,524 U.S. at 807; see Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. A tangible employment action
is one that constitutes "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
81 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757.
82 Whether an employer who makes out the affirmative defense escapes liability
altogether or simply avoids paying damages is a matter of dispute. I have argued in an
earlier piece that the affirmative defense should not operate to bar liability, but only to
reduce damages. See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment,61 U. PITT. L. REv. 671, 704-09 (2000). Some courts, however, have
construed the defense quite broadly as a complete defense to liability. See id. at 709-15
(citing cases).
83 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted); Faragher,524 U.S. at 807 (providing
identical language). Several courts have quite inexplicably eliminated the second prong of
the affirmative defense entirely. See Grossman, supra note 82, at 711 (citing cases); see also
Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that the
employer need not prove the second prong of the affirmative defense when the first prong is
satisfied); Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (same).

1042

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1029

effective remedial action. 84 Distinguishing between a supervisor and co-worker
has obvious importance, and the Court ruled in a 2013 case, Vance v. Ball State
University,85 that a harasser does not qualify as a supervisor unless he or she
has the power to "take tangible employment actions against the victim"-colloquially, the power to hire and fire. 86 This standard omits those employees
who dictate many or all aspects of one's daily working conditions, but lack the
ultimate power over one's job.
The affirmative defense, which carves out an exception to a general rule of
automatic liability, represents a key shift in Title VII law from an emphasis on
substance to an emphasis on procedure. The question is not whether employers
have successfully prevented or responded to problems of harassment, but
whether they have erected an internal system designed to do those thingswhether successful or well-engineered or neither. As Justice Kennedy declared
in Ellerth, the very purpose of Title VII is "to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. '87 This shift was
reinforced the following year in Kolstad v. American DentalAss 'n,88 in which
the Court held that an employer may not be forced to pay punitive damages
(which are authorized by statute) for supervisory harassment when the conduct
89
is contrary to the employer's good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
After this burst of activity at the close of the twentieth century, including
two key decisions on sexual harassment in the educational context, 90 the Court

84 See Faragher,524 U.S. at 799 (stating that lower courts have "uniformly judg[ed]
employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard"); see also id.
(collecting cases); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (2002) ("With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the
conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.").
85 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
86

Id. at 2439.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. Justice O'Connor echoed this approach the following year in
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999), declaring that law encourages
employers "to adopt antidiscrimination policies and to educate their personnel on Title VII's
prohibitions." Theresa Beiner has criticized courts for making voluntary compliance with
prophylactic rules a central rather than collateral purpose of Title VII. See generally Theresa
M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science
Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 273 (2001) (reviewing literature on the training effect and victim response to
harassment).
88 527 U.S. 526, 545.
87

89

Id.

90 See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that Title IX

recipients are liable for harassment by students based on the same standard as for
harassment by employees); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998)
(holding that Title IX recipients can be held liable for sexual harassment by teachers or
other employees only if they have actual notice of the harassment and respond with
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largely stepped back from the issue, allowing lower federal courts to start
filling in the gaps. In addition to Vance, mentioned above, it decided only a
handful of relatively narrow harassment cases in the first fifteen years of the
next century, only two of which are worth noting. 9' In Pennsylvania State
Police v. Suders,92 the Court tackled the thorny question of constructive
discharge, which was made more complicated by the Court's distinction in
Faragherand Ellerth between the standards of liability for different types of
harassment. 93 In Suders, the plaintiff alleged that she quit her job with the state
police because of pervasive sexual harassment by her supervisors and
escalating harassment and derision when she complained. 94 The Court ruled
that constructive discharge constitutes a "tangible employment action"triggering automatic liability with no opportunity for the employer to prove the
affirmative defense--only if the employee's resignation was precipitated by
some official, employer-sanctioned adverse action. 95 In National Railroad
Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Morgan,96 the Court held that hostile

environment harassment is a so-called continuing violation such that a Title
VII's relatively short statute of limitations (180 or 300 days, depending on the
level of coordination between the federal and state anti-discrimination
agencies) is triggered anew by each related incident. 97 A complainant, then,
can sue not only for the incident that occurred within the limitations period, but
also for the whole course of acts that together comprised the hostile working
98
environment.
Over the course of almost three decades, courts constructed sexual
harassment doctrine, and a cottage industry of anti-harassment advice, policies,
and procedures developed in its wake. In the next section, I consider the
questions that the fast-moving law left little time for: Did it work, and at what
cost?
III.

THE MIDLIFE CRISIS: HAVE WE GONE TOO FAR OR NOT FAR ENOUGH?

A recent controversy over Harvard Law School's sexual harassment policy
is somewhat emblematic of a larger debate. The federal Office for Civil Rights
deliberate indifference);.
91

Minor cases include Pollardv. E.1 du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001),

in which the Court ruled that front pay is a form of equitable relief that is not subject to the
damages cap under Title VII, and Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which it
held that the employer-size requirement under Title VII was not jurisdictional in nature and
therefore could be waived if not challenged at the appropriate time.
92 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004).
93 Id. at 137-40.
94 Id. at 135-37.
95 Id. at 148-49.

96 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
97 Id. at 117.

9i Id. at 117-19.
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cited Harvard for a policy that did not go far enough to implement Title IX's
prohibition of sexual harassment; 99 meanwhile, its faculty protested publicly
that the policy went too far, compromising the rights of the accused harassers
and basic principles of fairness. 100 The broader academic debate about the
direction of sexual harassment law raises a version of the same question: Has it
gone too far or not far enough?
The Supreme Court decisions that limn the contours of sexual harassment
law are only the beginning of the story. With the cornerstones of the doctrine
in place, the next phase of construction was left to lower federal courts and,
perhaps more importantly, employers and their consultants trying to navigate
the relatively new regime. A significant critique from the "not far enough"
camp arises from the way in which lower federal courts fleshed out the
doctrinal details. In turning the Supreme Court's broad brush pronouncements
into a more detailed set of rules and standards, federal courts often
misconstrued the intended scope of Title VII and narrowed the protections for
victims of harassment. Let's consider just a handful of examples that support
this critique.
The Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense imposes, in effect, a poliCy-andprocedure requirement on employers and a prompt complaint requirement on
harassed employees. According to the Court's articulation of the defense, an
employer can avoid liability or damages if it has taken reasonable care to
prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior and the plaintiff "unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer.. . ."101 Armed with these instructions, lower federal courts

issued a series of rulings that ignored the express terms of the defense, as well
as the social realities of the workplace, and lost sight of the law's purpose of
promoting employment equality through the elimination of sexually harassing
behaviors. Several courts, for example, held that if an employer satisfies the
first prong of the affirmative defense-the one focused on the employer's
conduct-it does not also need to satisfy the second one, despite the Court's
clear use of a conjunctive to join the two clauses and clear intent to err on the

99See Letter from Joel J. Berner, Reg'l Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
to Martha Minow, Dean, Harv. Law Sch. 2-3 (Dec. 30, 2014), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/docurnents/press-releases/harvard-law-letter.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/2FTR-GHVT.
1o See Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Editorial, Rethink Harvard's Sexual Harassment
Policy, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2014, at Al1. Faculty at Penn Law School published a similar
"open letter," protesting its university's sexual assault procedures. See Members of the Penn
Law School Faculty, Sexual Assault Complaints: ProtectingComplainantsand the Accused
Students
at
Universities
(Feb.
18,
2015),
available
at
http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CY3MYMPA.
101Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
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side of employer liability. 0 2 Other courts took a strict and entirely unrealistic
view of how quickly and assertively employees must complain' 0 3 about
harassment and how many obstacles they must overcome to do so. 10 4 Courts'
refusals to consider context as a determinant of reasonableness is a thread that
runs through contemporary discrimination law more generally, making antidiscrimination rights among the hardest to enforce. 10 5
At the same time courts were insisting that employees rush to file
complaints for fear of forfeiting their substantive rights against discrimination,
they were weakening the protections against retaliation. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court has made grand proclamations about the harm of retaliation
and the right to be protected from it. But doctrinal developments of those
pronouncements have weakened the protection substantially and allowed a
common problem to flourish. Moreover, less protection against retaliation
provides a further deterrent to complaining, which, as discussed above, reduces
an employee's ability to enforce substantive rights against harassment. The
weakening has taken two primary forms.

102 See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he

ASP is entitled to a modified EllerthiFaragheraffirmative defense, despite the ASP's
inability to prove the second element."); Watkins v. Prof'l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (finding that when the first element
was satisfied, no reasonable jury could find an employer liable); Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 271 (5th Cir. 1999);.
103 See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson, 347 F.3d 1272, 1292-93 (1lth Cir. 2003)
(concluding that a three-month delay was unreasonable as a matter of law); Madray v.
Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that
complaining to managers not designated by the policy is unreasonable for purposes of the
affirmative defense); Green v. Wills Grp., Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (D. Md. 2001)
(holding that complaining to wrong person rendered victim's behavior unreasonable);
Marsicano v. Am. Soc'y of Safety Eng'rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 4, 1998) (finding seven-day delay in complaining unreasonable even though
harassment began on first day of employment). For a more exhaustive analysis of the
affirmative defense caselaw, see Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The
Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 3 (2003) [hereinafter Grossman, Culture of Compliance]; Grossman, supra note 82, at
704-15; L. Camille Hebert, Why Don't "Reasonable Women" Complain About Sexual
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711 (2007).
104 Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that "a
generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment");
Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that being "too scared"
is not a justification for failing to complain without evidence to substantiate such fears); Hill
v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "apprehension does
not eliminate the requirement that the employee report harassment").
105 For an exhaustive argument to this effect, see Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L.
Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859
(2008).
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First, the "materially adverse" standard set forth in Burlington Northern was
interpreted with little concern for the context that surrounds the decision of an
10 6
actual discrimination victim whether to complain. In Higgins v. Gonzales,
for example, the Eighth Circuit ruled that withholding mentoring or
supervision was insufficiently adverse to deter complaints-and therefore did
not qualify as actionable retaliation. 0 7 Neither, the court suggested, would
involuntary transfer to a different city, despite all the inconveniences of
uprooting home and family. 108 Rather, the implication of Burlington Northern
and its progeny is that reasonable employees are "resilient, self-sufficient, and
willing to risk the loss of congenial relationships at work in exchange for the
assertion of civil rights."' 0 9
Second, courts have taken the "reasonable belief' doctrine casually
suggested in Breeden and turned it into an almost insurmountable hurdle for
retaliation claims brought under the opposition clause. Courts require
retaliation plaintiffs to prove that they had sufficient factual evidence of
discrimination before they complained-in a context where employers hold far
more of the information than employees. This puts pressure on employees to
lie low and gather evidence before complaining, while the prompt-filing
doctrine discussed above counsels just the opposite. Moreover, the standard is
so high in some jurisdictions that it equals the standard to survive summary
judgment on the underlying discrimination claim-a standard that would only
be applied after discovery had taken place." 0 Courts also require retaliation
plaintiffs to show they had a reasonable belief that the conduct complained of
was against the law-measured, by some courts, by their knowledge of

existing law-including circuit-specific precedents.1 1
106 481 F.3d 578, 585-86, 590 (8th Cir. 2007).

107 Id at 585 ("Any lack of mentoring or supervision simply does not rise to the level of
an adverse employment action, as she cannot establish the absence had any effect on her
employment situation.").
108 Id. at 591; see also Halfacre v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. 05-6619, 2007 WL
1028860, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007) (refusing to treat ostracism by management as
materially adverse); McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that denial of transfer from night shift to day shift after supporting coworker's complaint of
discrimination was not materially adverse).
109 Brake & Grossman, supranote 105, at 907,
"10 See, e.g., Bazemore v. Georgia Tech. Auth., No. 1:05-CV-1850-WSD-WEJ, 2007 WL
917280, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (concluding that belief of discrimination was
unreasonable even though black plaintiff knew that white coworker who engaged in similar
misconduct was not subjected to disciplinary action); Kennedy v. Guthrie Pub. Sch., No.
CIV-05-1440-F, 2007 WL 895145, at *5-6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2007) (concluding that
plaintiffs perception of discrimination was unreasonable where he knew that eleven white
high school principals were given raises, but he, a black high school principal, was not).
...See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002)
("[PIlaintiffs may not stand on their ignorance of the substantive law to argue that their
belief was reasonable."); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d
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The examples discussed in this section are far from exhaustive, but they are
illustrative of twin trends to narrow substantive protections against harassment
(despite the Supreme Court's broad pronouncements) and erect procedural
obstacles that make those protections even more elusive. Thus. despite more
than thirty years of doctrinal development and broad proclamations about its
interference with equal employment opportunity, sexual harassment remains
disturbingly common and unaddressed.' 12 Perhaps worse, the law has done
little to change the cultural understanding of sexual misconduct and the ways
in which it impedes workplace equality. We are left instead with a somewhat
confused doctrine that rewards the proliferation of policies
and procedures, but
13
never inquires whether they have had the desired effect.'
While some voices criticize sexual harassment law for stopping short of its
goal, others complain of its overreach. Vicki Schultz, for example, published a
powerful critique of sexual harassment doctrine, in which she argued that the
law has facilitated a "neo-Taylorist project of suppressing sexuality and
intimacy in the workplace. . . without even inquiring into whether that
behavior undermines gender equality on the job." 114 Schultz faults current
doctrine for failing to distinguish between harmless sexual behavior and
discriminatory sexual behavior-and for being satisfied by the elimination of
sex from the workplace, regardless of whether sex-based conduct continues to

701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs retaliation claim for lack of reasonable belief;
plaintiffs complaint of sexual orientation discrimination was not objectively reasonable
because such discrimination is not prohibited under Title VII); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs.,
Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999) (measuring plaintiff's underlying claims of
sexual harassment against "existing substantive law" and whether conduct was "severe or
pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive" in a retaliation
claim).
112 For varied criticism of sexual harassment law's inefficacy, see THERESA M. BEINER,
GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL

HARASSMENT LAW (2005) (arguing that the disconnect between judicial assumptions about
typical responses to workplace harassment and the social realities undermines the law's
efficacy); LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 24, at 72 (discussing critique that civil rights
victories of the 1970s "are being quietly rolled back by lax enforcement officers and hostile
judges"); Brake & Grossman, supra note 105; Hebert, supra note 103, at 715 (arguing that
the rules of employer liability have been applied "in ways quite hostile to the interests of
women who have been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the interests of employers
whose supervisory employees have been accused of sexual harassment").
113 For more on this critique, see Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 103.
114 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003); see also
Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure:
Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 22 BERKELEY J. EM. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) ("Until we know much more
about anti-discrimination training and its effects, the existence of sexual harassment or
diversity programs should not be considered a fact relevant to employer liability for
compensatory damages in any discrimination suit.").
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oppress.' 1 5 Janet Halley argues that we should "take a break from feminism"
and rethink the treatment of sexuality in law. 116 These and other feminist
critiques of sexual harassment law do not question the existence of inequality,
but rather whether the law is focusing on the right conduct or the right
categories, and whether it is being effectively deployed.
CONCLUSION

The fiftieth anniversary of Title VII provides an appropriate occasion to
look back-in this case, to an era when women suffered sexual abuse in the
workplace (and many other places) with no possible recourse. Once feminist
writers and litigators connected the dots, judges came to understand that a
broad mandate to end sex discrimination had to include a mandate to eliminate
sexual harassment at work. The decades that followed saw the step-by-step
construction of a doctrine that ostensibly protects employees from unwanted
sexual behavior at work. The question for the next decade is whether the
structure we have created is doing the job we want-and what changes might
be justified.

"1 Schultz, supra note 114, at 2064; see also Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with
Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 746 (1997) ("Shutting down all sexual behavior
seems like an overreaction to the problem of sexual harassment, and requires some very
disturbing assumptions about the possibility of female sexual agency ... ").
116 JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM

(2006). Sexual harassment law has also been critiqued from libertarian perspectives for
unjustifiably restraining speech and for invading employee privacy. See, e.g., Eugene
Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L. REv. 1791
(1992) (urging courts to distinguish between targeted sexual speech and undirected speech).
Some feminists have cited similar concerns. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED
GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 13 (2000) ("Because it is difficult to

know in advance what kind of sexually related behavior or speech a reasonable juror might
find hostile or offensive, prudent employers and school administrators, in an effort to avoid
liability, have a strong incentive to monitor and punish far more private speech and conduct
than the law actually forbids."); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the
Workplace and the Problem ofDiscriminatoryHarassment,75 TEx. L. REV. 687 (1997).

